Catching up to Our Biometric Future: Fourth Amendment Privacy Rights and Biometric Identification Technology by Ng, Rudy
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 28 | Number 3 Article 3
1-1-2006
Catching up to Our Biometric Future: Fourth
Amendment Privacy Rights and Biometric
Identification Technology
Rudy Ng
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rudy Ng, Catching up to Our Biometric Future: Fourth Amendment Privacy Rights and Biometric Identification Technology, 28 Hastings
Comm. & Ent. L.J. 425 (2006).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol28/iss3/3
Catching Up To Our Biometric Future:
Fourth Amendment Privacy Rights and
Biometric Identification Technology
by RUDY NG*
I. Introduction ............................................................................................. 425
II. Overview of Biometric Recognition Technology ................................ 428
A . B iom etrics ................................................................................................ 428
B . Fingerprints ............................................................................................. 429
C. DNA .................................................. ........................... 430
D . Iris Scanning ............................................................................................ 431
E. Facial Recognition Technology ............................................................. 432
III. Fourth Amendment Privacy Rights ...................................................... 433
A . B iom etrics ................................................................................................ 433
B. Compulsory DNA Sampling of Convicted Felons .............................. 435
C. D NA D ata Bank Expansion .................................................................. 436
IV . Legislative Considerations ..................................................................... 439
A. The Future for Emerging Biometrics ................................................... 439
V . C onclusion ............................................................................................... 442
I. Introduction
The concept of identifying people via their unique biometric
identifiers is not a new idea. It has long been recognized that a
person's fingerprint is a unique way to identify that person.
However, some more recent advances in technology have called into
question the constitutionality of these new forms of biometric
' University of California, Hastings College of the Law, J.D. Candidate, 2006; San
Francisco State University, M.S. in Biochemistry, 2001; University of California, Berkeley,
B.A. in Biochemistry, 1996. I would like to thank my family and friends for their loving
support and encouragement, especially Queenie Mak for editing this Note and for keeping
me sane throughout this adventure called law school.
1. See Federal Bureau of Investigations, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/ident.htm (last
visited Mar. 8, 2006).
identification.2 After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, one of
our primary concerns has been ensuring for our homeland security.'
New, more rigorous forms of biometric screening have been proposed
and implemented in some instances.4 For example, San Francisco
International Airport has installed hand geometry identification
stations for employees in some secure areas.' Before being allowed to
proceed into restricted areas, employees must place their hand on a
biometric reader, which scans their hand and compares it to images
stored in a database.6
Another area of concern is tracking known or suspected
criminals. A proposed method to achieve this is to use face
recognition technology which can quickly scan an individual's facial
geometry from a surveillance video and attempt to match that
person's face to a database of millions of known or suspected
criminals.7 The science fiction movie Minority Report illustrated the
use of iris scanners not only to provide positive identification of
individuals who had been apprehended by the police, but also to
identify ordinary citizens walking down the street in order to project
personalized advertisements to them.8 The future may not be as far
away as we think. Foreign and domestic banks have experimented
with the use of fingerprint and iris scanning technologies in ATMs.9
In addition, police in London, England have been using face
recognition technology as part of their Citywatch program aimed at
reducing crime in the community.' ° The question is how far we are
willing to take this technology, especially in regards to tracking
known or suspected criminals.
2. John D. Woodward, Biometric Scanning, Law & Policy: Identifying the Concerns
- Drafting the Biometric Blueprint, 59 U. PIr. L. REV. 97, 139-40 (1997).
3. See Marsha Walton, Biometrics must balance privacy and security, CNN.COM,
Dec. 22,2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/science/12/02/biometrics.story/index.html.
4. Jack H. Daniel, Reform in Airport Security: Panic or Precaution?, 53 MERCER L.
REV. 1623, 1635 (2002).
5. See Patricia Barnes, Keeping Security risks at bay at San Francisco International
Airport, ACCESS CONTROL & SECURITY SYSTEM, Aug. 1, 1997,
http://securitysolutions.com/mag/security-keeping-security-risks/.
6. Id.
7. See Identix Inc., http://www.identix.com/products/pro.security-bnp-argus.html#
(last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
8. See Minority Report (DreamWorks Pictures 2002).
9. Robyn Moo-Young, "Eyeing" the Future: Surviving the Criticisms of Biometric
Authentication, 5 N.C. BANKING INST. 412, 423-24 (2001).
10. Birmingham City Centre CCTV Installs Visionics' Facelt, BIOMETRIC DIGEST,
May 2001, at 3.
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In United States v. Kincade," the Ninth Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of
2000, which required certain convicted felons to submit blood samples
from which authorities could obtain their DNA profile.12 Convicted
felons' DNA profiles are kept in a DNA data bank to either provide
evidence against or exonerate them if they were ever suspected of
another crime. 3 This ruling by the Ninth Circuit could potentially
pave the way to requiring convicted felons to submit to the collection
of other types of biometric identification data, such as iris or face
recognition scans. As with current DNA databases, iris and face
recognition data would then be stored in databases and shared with
authorities throughout the nation." Tracking suspected criminals
could be as easy as matching an image of their face from a
surveillance video at their local shopping mall to an image in the face
recognition database. 5 How far are we willing to invade the privacy
rights of individuals in the name of security?
These concerns are not restricted to convicted felons. While
there are statutes in all fifty states which require certain convicted
felons to submit DNA samples so law enforcement can maintain their
DNA profile, 6 these DNA data banks are being supplemented with
DNA profiles from people who have been arrested but have not been
convicted of crimes." If people not convicted of any crimes are being
included in DNA data banks, then is this opening the door for the
collection of other types of biometric data, such as face or iris
recognition data, from people who are merely suspected of
committing a crime? Is this the beginning of the slippery slope that
may lead us to a world where a person suspected of committing a
crime has to seek out an unscrupulous back-alley physician to
perform an eye transplant surgery in order to maintain his or her
freedom and privacy, as in the movie Minority Report? Clearly there
are other concerns besides keeping our streets safer by making it
easier for law enforcement personnel to identify recidivist activities.
11. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004).
12. Id. at 840 (holding that "compulsory DNA profiling pursuant to the federal DNA
Act would have occasioned no violation of Kincade's Fourth Amendment rights.").
13. Id. at 819-20.
14. Debra A. Herlica, DNA Databanks: When Has a Good Thing Gone Too Far?, 52
SYRACUSE L. REv. 951, 958 (2002).
15. See Indentix Inc., http://www.identix.com/products/pro-faceit.html (last visited
Mar. 8, 2006).
16. Herlica, supra note 14, at 955.
17. CA Prop. 69 (approved by voters Nov. 2, 2004).
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Part II of this note is an overview of biometric recognition
technology, especially iris scanning and face recognition technology.
Part III provides an analysis of individual privacy rights under the
Fourth Amendment in relation to biometric technology, the
compulsory DNA sampling of convicted felons, and DNA databases,
especially in light of recent Federal Court of Appeals decisions and
recently passed legislation. Part IV presents legislative considerations
for the collection of less invasive biometric data that is easier to
collect and monitor passively, such as facial recognition data. Finally,
Part V provides a summary of the discussion.
II. Overview of Biometric Recognition Technology
A. Biometrics
Biometrics refers to the automated methods of identifying a
person based on their unique physical characteristics.18 In a typical
application, an individual's physical traits are scanned by a machine
and then a comparison is made to a database containing previously
stored information about that individual. 9 This process is used to
positively identify the individual and is referred to as verification, or
one-to-one matching.20 For example, one-to-one matching could be
used at a security checkpoint before allowing individuals access to
restricted areas of a building.2 Biometric scanning can also be used
to identify a person by comparing their biometric data to all of the
records that have been stored in the database.22 This process is
referred to as identification, or one-to-many matching.2 For example,
one-to-many matching could be used to identify an unknown person
by trying to match their biometric data to the data of known
individuals saved in a database.
18. Woodward, supra note 2, at 99. See also Biometrics Consortium,
http://biometrics.org/html/introduction.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
19. Woodward, supra note 2, at 100. See also Robin Feldman, Considerations on the
Emerging Implementation of Biometric Technology, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J.
653, 655-56 (2003).
20. Woodward, supra note 2, at 100. See also Robin Feldman, Considerations on the
Emerging Implementation of Biometric Technology, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 653,
655-56 (2003).
21. See supra note 6.
22. Woodward, supra note 2, at 100. See also Feldman, supra note 19, at 656.
23. Woodward, supra note 2, at 100. See also Feldman, supra note 19, at 656.
24. Woodward, supra note 2, at 100. See also Feldman, supra note 19, at 656.
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B. Fingerprints
Historically, fingerprints have been the most common and widely
accepted form of biometric identification." Fingerprint identification
has been used by law enforcement since the early twentieth century.26
Fingerprint identification initially required the fingerprint examiner
to go through the tedious process of manually comparing ink
fingerprints fixed onto fingerprint cards.27 This process was very time
consuming and could often take months to complete.28 However, the
fingerprint identification process has been computerized and
automated.29 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) now uses the
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). °
IAFIS contains the fingerprints and corresponding criminal history
information for more than 47 million subjects, making it the largest
biometric database in the world.31  The process of matching
fingerprints, which used to take months to complete, can now be
performed in a few hours.32 For example, the FBI can identify an
unknown person who left a latent fingerprint at a crime scene by
comparing the crime scene fingerprint to the IAFIS database.33
Fingerprint identification involves comparing an individual's
unique ridge formations or patterns found on the fingertips.' These
fingertip patterns include ridge formations called whorls, arches and
loops. 35 Fingerprint identification relies on the empirically validated
assumptions that no two persons have the exact same arrangement of
ridge patterns on their fingertips, and that an individual's fingerprints
remain unchanged throughout their life.36
25. John Brogan, Facing the Music: The Dubious Constitutionality of Facial
Recognition Technology, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 65, 69-70 (2002).
26. Woodward, supra note 2, at 104.
27. See Federal Bureau of Investigations, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/iafis.htm (last
visited Mar. 8, 2006).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See Federal Bureau of Investigations, supra note 27.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See supra note 1.
35. See Federal Bureau of Investigations,
http://www.fbi.gov/filelink.html?file=/hq/cjisd/ident.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2006). See also
Moo-Young, supra note 9, at 431.
36. See supra note 1.
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An advantage of fingerprint identification is that it is widely
accepted by the public and law enforcement as an accurate and
repeatable means for identifying individuals." In addition, finger
scanning technology is a quick, non-invasive method of gathering
biometric data." A disadvantage of finger imaging is that dirt, oils or
cuts on a person's finger can lead to errors in the results.39
C. DNA
Another, more modern, biometric identification technique
involves the use of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).' ° Each cell in a
person's body contains DNA.4 DNA is composed of nucleotides
arranged in a three-dimensional double helix, and comprises an
individual's heritable genetic material.' 2 DNA has useful forensic
applications because the sequence of nucleotides of every individual
is unique (except for identical twins), which makes DNA ideal for
43identification purposes.
Two commonly used techniques for DNA identification are
Restriction-Fragment-L-ength-Polymorphism-(-RF-LP-)-analysis-and-the
Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR). '  RFLP analysis is based on
naturally occurring minor differences in each person's DNA
sequence." Since each individual's DNA sequence is unique, by
selectively visualizing the areas where these minor differences occur,
forensic examiners can determine an individual's "DNA
fingerprint." 6 PCR is a method of making many copies of a specific
segment of DNA. 7 PCR is useful for testing very small samples. 8
For example, the DNA from a tiny amount of tissue or blood found at
37. Woodward, supra note 2, at 105.
38. Moo-Young, supra note 9, at 432.
39. Id. at 433.
40. Sheryl H. Love, Allowing New Technology to Erode Constitutional Protections: A
Fourth Amendment Challenge to Non-Consensual DNA Testing of Prisoners, 38 VILL. L.
REV. 1617, 1632 (1993).
41. NEIL A. CAMPBELL, BIOLOGY 7 (Edith B. Brady ed., 3rd ed.
Benjamin/Cummings Pub., 1993) (1987).
42. Id. at 8.
43. Id. at 409.
44. Id. at 402-03.
45. Id.
46. Campbell, supra note 41, at 409.
47. Id. at 399, 401.
48. Id.
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a crime scene can be amplified into a useable amount via the PCR
method. 9
Similar to fingerprinting, an advantage of DNA analysis is that it
is widely accepted by scientists, the public and law enforcement as an
accurate and repeatable means for identifying individuals." For
example, the FBI has implemented the Combined DNA Index
System (CODIS), which allows crime laboratories across the nation
to electronically compare the DNA profiles of subjects. 1 However, a
disadvantage of DNA identification is that it involves more physically
invasive techniques, such as taking a blood sample or buccal swab. 2
In addition, the RFLP and PCR methods must be performed under
laboratory conditions, so test results are not available immediately. 3
D. Iris Scanning
Iris scanning utilizes the colored part of the eye surrounding the
pupil, known as the iris, as the biometric characteristic for
identification. 4 The iris contains a multitude of structures 55 that
uniquely identify an individual. 6  A high-resolution video camera
captures an image of the iris, which is then automatically compared to
images stored in a database. 7 Iris scanning technology is utilized
around the world at airports, prisons, hospitals, and schools58 and has
potential uses in the banking industry at ATMs.5 9
An advantage of iris scanning is that the entire process typically
takes about two or three seconds, making results immediately
available. 6 In addition, an accurate image of an iris can be taken
from up to three feet away, so iris scanning is a non-invasive
49. Id. at 399, 401-02.
50. Love, supra note 40, at 1631-33.
51. See Federal Bureau of Investigations,
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/program.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
52. Herlica, supra note 14, at 960.
53. Campbell, supra note 41, at 399, 401.
54. Moo-Young, supra note 9, at 428.
55. Id. ("These include the corona, pits, filaments, crypts, striation, radial furrows,
and other structures.")
56. Woodward, supra note 2, at 103.
57. Ashley Dunn, The Cutting Edge, The Password is Biometrics - High-Tech
Identification Systems Are Moving Into the Corporate and PC Worlds, Offering Log-On
Security in the Blink of an Eye or the Tap of a Finger, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1998 at C1.
58. See Iridian Technologies, http://www.iridiantech.com/solutions.php?page=2 (last
visited Mar. 8, 2006). See also Ian Austen, How It Works; A Scanner Skips the ID Card
and Zeros in on the Iris, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2003 at G8.
59. Moo-Young, supra note 9, at 423.
60. Dunn, supra note 57, at C1.
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identification technique.61 A disadvantage of iris scanning is that,
while it may be relatively unobtrusive, current iris scanning
technology still requires the cooperation of the subject in order for
the camera to take a useable image of the iris (i.e. the user must look
straight into the camera without blinking).62  However, future
advances in iris scanning technology may allow systems to
surreptitiously take iris scans at greater distances.63 Also, although
iris scanners are able to take an image of an iris through clear
eyeglasses or contact lenses, iris scanners are ineffective if the user is
wearing sunglasses or eyeglasses with a reflective coating. 
6
E. Facial Recognition Technology
The final method of biometric identification discussed here is
facial recognition technology. Facial recognition technology involves
taking a picture of a subject's face65 or capturing their image from
video surveillance.6 The system then processes the image and
converts it into a digital template based on the geometry of the
individual's face. 67 Finally, the individual's biometric data is matched
against data stored in a database. 6'
An advantage of face recognition technology is that it is a very
unobtrusive biometric identification technique.69  Surveillance
cameras can capture images of an individual's face without the
individual's knowledge or cooperation. ° In addition, face recognition
technology can match individuals despite changes in their expression,
facial hair, or hair style.71 The main disadvantage of face recognition
61. Id.
62. Lisa J. McGuire, Banking on Biometrics: Your Bank's New High-Tech Method of
Identification May Mean Giving Up Your Privacy, 33 AKRON L. REV. 441, 448 (2000).
63. See Iridian Technologies,
http://www.iridiantech.comlnews.php?page=l&rel=062402 (last visited Mar. 8, 2006). See
also supra note 8.
64. McGuire, supra note 62, at 448.
65. Moo-Young, supra note 9, at 437.
66. See Birmingham City Centre CCTV Installs Visonics; Facelt, supra note 10, at 3;
supra note 7.
67. Moo-Young, supra note 9, at 437.
68. Id. See also Indentix, http://www.identix.com/trends/face.html (last visited Mar. 8,
2006).
69. Moo-Young, supra note 9, at 437. See also Indentix,
http://www.identix.com/trends/face.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
70. Moo-Young, supra note 9, at 437. See also Indentix,
http://www.identix.com/trends/face.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
71. See Indentix, http://www.identix.com/trendsrS_face.html (last visited Mar. 8,
2006).
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technology is that it has a lower accuracy rate than other biometric
identification techniques." In addition, if the subject's face is not
properly illuminated due to poor lighting conditions, shadows, or
glare, then the accuracy of face recognition technology is reduced
further.73
HI. Fourth Amendment Privacy Rights
A. Biometrics
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects individuals from being subject to "unreasonable searches and
seizures."74  The United States Supreme Court addressed privacy
under the Fourth Amendment in Katz v. United States.7 ' The Court,
while noting that the "Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a
general constitutional 'right to privacy,"' held that the Fourth
Amendment does "protect individual privacy from certain kinds of
governmental intrusion., 76  Katz provided a two-pronged test for
determining when a governmental action constitutes an unreasonable
search." The two factors a court should consider are whether an
individual has an actual subjective expectation of privacy and whether
that expectation is one that society is willing to objectively recognize
as reasonable. 7 Subsequently, the Court has held that no reasonable
expectation of privacy exists for things that an individual exposes to
the eyes of the public.79
More recently, in Kyllo v. United States,'O the Court faced the
issue of whether the Government's use of a thermal imaging device to
scan a private home constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment." In Kyllo, agents from the Department of the Interior
across the street from petitioner's home used a thermal imager to
determine whether heat was emanating from petitioner's home
72. Feldman, supra note 19, at 658-59.
73. See supra note 71.
74. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
75. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
76. Id. at 350.
77. Id. at 361.
78. Id.
79. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (applying the Katz two-prong test
to a situation where police flew over respondent's house in an airplane and observed
marijuana plants growing in respondent's backyard).
80. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
81. Id. at 29.
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consistent with the use of special lights to grow marijuana.2 Although
the Government argued that the petitioner had no subjective or
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the heat was
being radiated from the external surface of the house, the Court held
that the agents' activity did constitute a search and was presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant.83 However, the Court limited its
holding to apply to situations where the "Government uses a device
that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that
would previously have been unknowable without physical
intrusion."8' This preserves the notion that the Fourth Amendment
does not protect an individual's privacy when he willingly exposes
something to the public."
In order for biometric identification methods to pass muster
under the Fourth Amendment, they must be reasonable." In
determining whether a search is reasonable, a court must balance the
extent of the intrusion on an individual's Fourth Amendment rights
against the government's legitimate interests in effectuating the
search. In addition, reasonableness depends on the circumstances in
which biometric identification is used. The government may have
compelling interests in certain areas, such as providing for secure air
travel, which argues in favor of the promotion of biometric
identification systems in airports." However, it is less clear how
significant an interest the government may have in other areas, such
as achieving secure ATM transactions or identifying convicted felons
from a crowd of people. These concerns are only magnified in light of
the advances in biometric technology which make it easier to
surreptitiously collect biometric data, such as face recognition images.
Although the use of biometrics such as iris scanning and face
recognition technology has not been addressed by the Court, the
82. Id. at 29-30.
83. Id. at 35, 40.
84. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
85. Bridget Mallon, "Every Breath You Take, Every Move You Make, I'll Be
Watching You": The Use of Face Recognition Technology, 48 VILL. L. REV. 955, 972
(2003).
86. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995) ("As the text of the Fourth
Amendment indicates, the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a governmental
search is 'reasonableness').
87. Id. at 652-53 (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619
(1989)).
88. Greg Star, Airport Security Technology: Is the Use of Biometric Identification
Technology Valid Under the Fourth Amendment?, 20 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 251,
263 (2002).
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analytical framework established by Katz can be applied to the use of
emerging biometric technology. 9 Keeping in line with its previous
holdings, the Court would most likely hold that an individual should
have no expectation of privacy while in a public place.90 Individuals
who are out in public places have chosen to expose themselves to the
public, whether it be to other people or to surveillance cameras
enabled with face recognition technology. 91 In addition, it is likely
that modern society's increased desire to protect public safety would
outweigh individuals' privacy interests when they are in public.'
Thus, future face recognition and iris scanning technologies fall short
of constituting an unreasonable search under the Court's current
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 9 Therefore, the government
should be free to use these types of biometric technology in public
places without violating an individual's constitutional privacy rights.94
B. Compulsory DNA Sampling of Convicted Felons
All fifty states and the District of Columbia have statutes that
require mandatory collection of DNA samples from individuals
convicted of certain crimes.95 In 1998, the California Legislature
enacted Chapter 696, which created the DNA and Forensic
Identification Data Bank.96 Under California Penal Code § 296,
anyone convicted of certain sex offenses, murder, voluntary
manslaughter, felony spousal abuse, aggravated sexual assault of a
child, certain felony offenses of assault and battery, kidnapping,
mayhem, or torture was required to submit a blood and saliva sample
from which the individual's DNA could be obtained.97 In 2002,
California Penal Code § 296 was amended by Chapter 906, which
expanded California's compulsory DNA sample submission
legislation to include individuals convicted of committing or
89. Mallon, supra note 85, at 977-78.
90. Id. at 976-77.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 977-78.
93. Id.
94. Mallon, supra note 85, at 978.
95. Bonnie L. Taylor, Storing DNA Samples of Non-Convicted Persons & the Debate
Over DNA Database Expansion, 20 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 509, 511 (2003). See Herlica,
supra note 14, at 955.
96. Scott N. Cameron, Chapter 906: California's DNA Data Bank Joins the Modern
Trend of Expansion, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 219,220 (2002).
97. Id. at 220-21.
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attempting to commit other felonies, including first-degree burglary,
first-degree robbery, specific types of arson, and carjacking."
The recent case, United States v. Kincade,9 examined the Fourth
Amendment constitutionality of a federal statute similar to California
Penal Code § 296. Under the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination
Act of 2000,00 individuals who have been convicted of certain federal
crimes must provide federal authorities with a biological sample of
their DNA.'O The Ninth Circuit held that convicted felons have
substantially diminished expectations of privacy because, once
convicted, the individual's identity becomes a matter of state
interest." In addition, there are overwhelming societal interests
supporting the collection of DNA information from convicted felons,
such as providing a deterrent effect helpful in reducing recidivism.13
Accordingly the Ninth Circuit held that compulsory DNA profiling of
convicted felons does not violate an individual's Fourth Amendment
rights."l
While the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Kincade reinforces the
constitutionality of the collection of DNA information from convicted
felons, it is still unclear how courts would rule on the collection of
other types of biometric data, such as iris scans or facial images. In
formulating its holding in Kincade, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the
point that extracting a blood sample from an individual amounted to
only a minor intrusion into an individual's personal privacy and
bodily integrity. This indicates that courts may look more favorably
on biometric identification techniques that pose an even lower threat
of intrusion into an individual's bodily integrity, such as iris scanning
or facial imaging.
C. DNA Data Bank Expansion
Bolstered by the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Kincade, the California
Legislature proposed Proposition 69 on the November 2004 ballot.""
98. Id. at 222.
99. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 816-17.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a (2000).
101. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 816-17.
102. Id. at 837.
103. Id. at 838-39.
104. Id. at 840.
105. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 836 (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 625 (1989) and Winston v.
Lee, 470 U.S. 753,762 (1985)).
106. See John M. Hubbell, Campaign 2004 - Prop. 69 Would Widen DNA Database;
Issue Seeks to Add More Criminals to Forensic Sample Pool, S.F. CHRONICLE, Oct. 26,
2004, at B3.
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Proposition 69 sought to amend California Penal Code § 296 to
require DNA profiling of all of California's convicted felons, not just
those convicted of serious felonies as in the previous statute.'O In
addition, beginning in 2009, Proposition 69 would require adults
arrested or charged with any felony offense to submit a DNA sample,
regardless of whether they were subsequently convicted of the
offense or not.'" The legislative findings accompanying Proposition
69 indicated that the state had a compelling interest in expanding its
DNA data bank to provide for the "accurate identification of criminal
offenders" and to "ensure that persons wrongly suspected or accused
of crimes are quickly exonerated so that they may reestablish their
standing in the community."' 9 The voters approved Proposition 69
on November 2, 2004."0
In upholding existing statutes requiring convicted felons to
submit samples to DNA data banks over Fourth Amendment
challenges in Kincade,'" the Ninth Circuit emphasized the fact that
convicted felons have minimal expectations of privacy."' However, in
contrast to convicted felons, individuals who have merely been
arrested or charged, but not convicted of any felony, do not have a
reduced expectation of privacy in providing their genetic
information.' 3 Furthermore, the government interest in deterring
recidivist activity is lessened when non-convicted individuals are
involved." '  Thus, the government's interest in improving the
identification techniques used by law enforcement may be
outweighed by the non-convicted individual's interest in keeping their
genetic information private."'
Proposition 69 does contain a provision whereby an individual
who has submitted their DNA sample for inclusion into the DNA
data bank can have their DNA specimen destroyed and their
database file expunged.16 However, in order to qualify for this
provision, the individual must not be charged or convicted of the
107. See Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 69 (2004). See also Hubbell, supra note 106, at B3.
108. Hubbell, supra note 106, at B3.
109. See Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 69 (2004).
110. See Greg Lucas and Vanessa Hua, State Propositions; Proposal to Expand DNA
Database on Criminals Headed for Approval, S.F. CHRONICLE, Nov. 3, 2004, at B3.
111. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 840.
112. Id. at 837.
113. Taylor, supra note 95, at 537.
114. Id. at 538.
115. Id. at 537.
116. See Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 69 (2004).
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underlying offense that served as the basis for their inclusion into the
DNA data bank.117 To have their DNA specimen destroyed and their
record expunged from the DNA data bank, the individual must file a
written request with the state's DNA Database and Data Bank
Identification Program."" Despite the inclusion of this provision into
Proposition 69, a non-convicted individual's privacy rights may be
more fully protected if their DNA specimen was destroyed and
database file was expunged automatically, rather than only upon a
written request.
Iris scanning and facial imaging provide a less intrusive method
for collecting biometric data than DNA sampling. With regard to
convicted felons, the government would have the same compelling
interests present with the collection of biometric data as it does with
requiring DNA samples."9 Thus, the application of traditional Fourth
Amendment principles to emerging biometric identification
technologies, such as iris scanning and facial recognition technology,
suggests that courts would uphold the use of biometrics in
conjunction with convicted felons.2 In addition, courts would also
likely uphold statutes requiring the inclusion of these types of
biometric data into data banks of convicted felons.' However, with
regard to non-convicted individuals, the government's interest in
collecting other forms of biometric identification data becomes less
compelling, especially if non-convicted individuals' biometric data is
being included in biometric data banks. Because of the ease and
speed that automated biometric identification systems can perform
one-to-one or one-to-many matching, inclusion of non-convicted
individual's biometric data into biometric data banks justifiably fuels
people's fears of having the Orwellian Big Brother monitoring their
every move. 3 Clearly, important legislative considerations must be
addressed as we rapidly catch up to the future of biometric
identification technology.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 69 (2004).
120. See generally Taylor, supra note 95, at 537-38. See also Cameron, supra note 96,
at 226-28.
121. See Taylor, supra note 95, at 537-38. See also Cameron, supra note 96, at 226-28.
122. See Taylor, supra note 95, at 537-38. See also Cameron, supra note 96, at 226-28.
123. Mallon, supra note 85, at 955.
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IV. Legislative Considerations
A. The Future for Emerging Biometrics
The Court has not spoken on the issue of the Fourth
Amendment constitutionality of emerging biometric identification
technology, such as iris scanning and face recognition technology.
However, the current legislative and legal framework that has been
applied to existing biometric identification techniques, such as DNA
profiling, can be extended and revised to accommodate these
emerging technologies. In formulating this framework, it is important
to keep in mind the tension between the principle that an individual
has no privacy rights while in public and the ideal that an individual
may have enhanced privacy rights against the surreptitious collection
of biometric data. Striking the proper balance and reaching an
acceptable compromise between these two principles should be one
of the goals of future legislation in the area of biometric identification
technology.
Facial recognition technology is intimately tied to the use of
cameras or video surveillance equipment. One of the first large scale
uses of face recognition technology occurred at the 2001 Super Bowl
in Tampa, Florida.2 Police employed video surveillance cameras set
up at the stadium entrances and face recognition technology to scan
100,000 faces at stadium turnstiles and compare them to a database of
1,700 criminals.2 5 This led the ACLU to dub the event the "Snooper
Bowl.'z'26 The system identified nineteen matches, however, police
determined that eighteen of those were false matches. 7 When police
were dispatched to find the one positive match, the suspect had
disappeared by the time officers arrived on the scene.'2 This
illustrates a drawback to face recognition technology in that video
surveillance is an inherently passive activity. Although face
recognition technology may be able to pick out suspects from large
crowds, it does not prevent crime or even ensure that police officers
will be able to apprehend the suspect.
124. Martin Kasindorf, "Big Brother" Cameras on Watch for Criminals, USA TODAY,
Aug. 2 2001, at A3. See also Mary Huhn, Just a Face in the Crowd? Superbowl Kicked Off
the Use of Face Recognition Software, but is this an Invasion of Privacy?, N.Y. POST, June
26, 2001, at 51.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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Interestingly, the Vermont Supreme Court has upheld the use of
video surveillance when "used in a narrow set of circumstances,
where the police had already determined that a crime was being
committed, and only as a substitute for in-person surveillance., 129
However, the court indicated that there may be a Fourth Amendment
violation "where video surveillance is aimed indiscriminately at public
places and captures lawful activities of many citizens in the hope that
it will deter crime or capture what crime might occur. ', 130 Thus, even
if individuals knowingly expose themselves to public places, the
government may run afoul of the Fourth Amendment if it
indiscriminately captures facial images of every passerby for
comparison to a database of known or suspected criminals, which is
exactly what occurred at the 2001 Super Bowl. Therefore, some
limitations should be placed on when the government will be allowed
to use video surveillance in conjunction with face recognition
technology.
For example, law enforcement could be required to have an
individualized suspicion or probable cause before allowing them to
use face recognition technology in public places. This standard could
mirror the requirements law enforcement officers must meet to
acquire advance judicial approval of a search warrant. A drawback of
such a requirement is that it may hinder the effective deployment of
face recognition technology, especially if law enforcement would like
to make expeditious use of the technology.
Alternatively, before being allowed to use face recognition
technology, law enforcement could be required to meet a standard
similar to that required for investigative stops under Terry v. Ohio.3'
In Terry, the Court addressed what standard law enforcement officers
must meet in justifying their decision to search people whom they
have detained. The Court held that subjective good faith on the
part of police officers is not enough.3 3 Instead, the Court held that
the Fourth Amendment requires police officers to meet an objective
reasonableness standard to justify a search in light of the particular
129. Vermont v. Costin, 720 A.2d 866, 870 (Vt. 1998).
130. Id.
131. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (holding that "in justifying the particular
intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion.").
132. Id. at 21-22.
133. Id. at 22.
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circumstances."M Applying the Terry standard to face recognition
technology, law enforcement agents would have to be able to
delineate objectively reasonable facts that, under the circumstances,
led them to believe that the use of face recognition technology was
necessary to identify the suspect.
In addition, time limitations should be placed on the extent of
the usage of face recognition technology. Thus, law enforcement
would not be able to set up a camera on a street corner and just wait
weeks or months until a suspected criminal happened to walk by and
the camera captured his or her image. Moreover, if law enforcement
wants to use face recognition technology in conjunction with video
surveillance equipment, then cameras should be clearly visible to the
public and marked with signs, rather than secretly hidden from the
public's view.
Because of the unobtrusive nature of face recognition
technology, and perhaps future iterations of iris scanning technology,
greater oversight is needed than with DNA database management
due to the increased potential for abuse.' This is especially true
when such technology is employed by the government because the
government has the resources to collect and store more information
than private parties and the government can also do more damage
with the information they collect.'36 DNA data banks were originally
created to help solve crimes that involved DNA evidence, not as a
means of preventing or deterring future crimes.'37 Following the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Kincade,38 Proposition 69 expanded the
scope of California's DNA data bank to include individuals convicted
of any felony.139 Thus, under the Ninth Circuit's approach, it would
seem likely that inclusion of a convicted felon's iris scan or facial
image into a database would not violate the Fourth Amendment.
However, legislation in this area should prohibit law enforcement
agencies from supplementing their facial image database with facial
scans of innocent private citizens whose facial images happen to be
captured by the cameras.
134. Id. at 21-22.
135. Marc J. Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the
Fourth Amendment to a World That Tracks Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349,
1431-32 (2004).
136. Id. at 1431.
137. Herlica, supra note 14, at 953.
138. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 840.
139. See Cal. Legis. Serv. Prop. 69 (2004).
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In addition to expanding the scope of California's DNA data
bank, Proposition 69 contains a provision whereby non-convicted or
acquitted individuals can request to have their DNA sample
destroyed and their DNA data bank file expunged.'40 Similarly, the
face recognition and iris scan database records of individuals arrested
or charged, but later eliminated as suspects, should be expunged.
However, because these types of biometric data may have been
obtained surreptitiously, the database records should be deleted
automatically, rather than by written request since the individual may
not even know of his or her inclusion into the biometric database.
V. Conclusion
As biometric identification technology companies strive to make
their products more accurate, faster, and more affordable for the
mass market,141 the public is only likely to see an increase in the use of
biometrics in the future. What may have seemed like a fanciful idea
in a science fiction movie a couple of years ago may be reality in the
near future. As we catch up to our biometric future, the legislature
and courts will need to address important Fourth Amendment
constitutional questions.
While emerging biometric identification technology, such as iris
scanning and face recognition technology, may be a fast, cutting-edge
way for law enforcement to keep track of convicted felons and
suspected terrorists, the government should not be allowed to
unreasonably intrude on individual privacy rights under the Fourth
Amendment. Ultimately, the legislature and courts will need to
weigh society's need to feel secure against their desire to protect
individual privacy and reach a reasonable compromise.
140. Id.
141. Dunn, supra note 57, at C.
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